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CRIMINAL LAW
THE CO-CONSPIRATORS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE: PROCEDURAL
IMPLEMENTATION AND CONFRONTATION CLAUSE REQUIREMENTS
NORMAN M. GARLAND* AND DONALD E. SNOWt
INTRODUCTION
Publicity surrounding the recent political con-
spiracy trials1 has made laymen aware that the
conspiracy charge is a powerful, if somewhat ill-
defined, prosecutorial tool. Both bench and bar,
however, recognized long ago the importance of
conspiracy indictments to prosecutors and the
need to protect defendants from special dangers
inherent in conspiracy prosecutions Despite such
recognition and the plethora of law review articles
on the subject,4 conspiracy remains one of the
least understood of all criminal offenses. 5
* J.D., Northwestern University, 1964; L.L.M.,
Georgetown University, 1965. Presently Associate
Professor of Law and Dean of Admissions at North-
western University School of Law.
t J.D., Northwestern University, 1970.
'See, e.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st
Cir. 1969); United States v. Dellinger, 69 CR 180
(N.D. Ill. 1969).
2 Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.§§ 1-7
(1964), the conspiracy prosecution was used frequently
to thwart the organization and growth of labor unions.
The enactment of the Norris-La Guardia (Anti-Injunc-
tion) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964), in 1932 finally
discouraged this practice.
I In 1925, Chief Justice Taft condemned the preva-
lent use of conspiracy charges brought "for the purpose
-or at least with the effect--of bringing in much im-
proper evidence," and emphasized that "the rules of
evidence in conspiracy cases make them most difficult
to try without prejudice to an innocent defendant."
Report of the Attorney General for 1925 5-6. See also
judge Hand speaking for the court in United States v.
Falcone, 100 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940):
[Today] many prosecutors seek to sweep within the
drag-net of conspiracy all those who have been
associated in any degree whatever with the main
offenders. That there are opportunities of great
oppression in such a doctrine is very plain, and it
is only by circumscribing the scope of such all com-
prehensive indictments that they can be avoided.
See Hudspeth v. McDonald, 130 F.2d 962 (10th Cir.
1941); see generally, O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by
Association, 61 HAnv. L. Rv. 592, 599 (1948). Perhaps
one of the best statements of the fear of misuse of con-
spiracy prosecutions appears in Justice Jackson's con-
curring opinion in Krulewitch v. United States, 336
U.S. 440, 446-47 (1946), quoted infra note 5.
4 See, e.g., Arens, Conspiracy Revisited, 3 BuFFALo
L. Rv. 242 (1954); Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning:
Guilt by Association, 54 GEO. L.J. 133 (1965); Harno,
Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. Rv. 624
(1941); Klein, Conspiracy-The Prosecutor's Darling,
24 BROoKLN L. REv. 1 (1957); Wechsler, Jones, &
Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model
One of the most confusing' aspects of the con-
spiracy crime is the evidentiary principle known as
the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.
Simply formulated, the co-conspirators exception
allows a conspirator to testify against his fellows
regarding words spoken or acts performed in fur-
therance of the conspiracy and during its pendency,
provided there exists independent proof to estab-
lish the conspiracy. This article will first focus on
the issues related to the independent proof require-
ment, including the critical issue of whether the
judge or the jury shall make the finding of inde-
pendent proof. Second, the validity and prospec-
tive vitality of the co-conspirators exception, and
the admission of hearsay generally, will be con-
sidered in light of recent decisions involving the
hearsay rule and the sixth amendment right of
confrontation. Before turning to these two areas,
it may be helpful to lay a foundation by brief y
reviewing the crime of conspiracy, the hears, y
rule, and the co-conspirator's exception.
CRIINAL CONSPIRACY
A criminal conspiracy is said to be a "partner-
ship in crime." 6 More specifically, a criminal con-
spiracy is "an agreement between two or more per-
sons to achieve an unlawful object or to achieve a
lawful object by unlawful means." 7 While many
Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt,
Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 957
(1961); Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of
Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62
HAgv. L. Rxv. 276 (1948).
6 "The modem crime of conspiracy is so vague that
it almost defies definition.... [Clhameleon-like, it takes
on a special coloration from each of the many inde-
pendent offenses on which it may be overlaid." Krule-
witch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440-47 (1946) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
"In the lohg category of crimes there is none, not
excepting criminal attempt, more difficult to confine
within the boundaries of definitive statement than con-
spiracy." Harno, supra note 4, at 625.
6United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910);
Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir.
1926).
7 Devzelopments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72
Hagv. L. REv. 920, 922 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Developments]; see Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S.
197, 203 (1893).
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jurisdictions require an overt act s as an element of
the offense, 9 agreement is the gist of a conspiracy. 0
The requisite agreement need not even be express;
it may be only a tacit, mutual understanding.1'
Moreover, criminal conspiracy is an independent
crime, a distinct offense, separate from its object
and from any substantive offenses committed in
pursuance of the conspiratorial agreement.
12
Because it often punishes conspirators for their
uncompleted acts, conspiracy finds justification as
' See 1 E. DEVrT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 29.07 (2d ed. 1970):
An 'overt act' is any act knowingly committed
by one of the conspirators, in an effort to effect or
accomplish some object or purpose of the con-
spiracy. The overt act need not be criminal in na-
ture, if considered separately and apart from the
conspiracy. It may be as innocent as the act of a
man walking across the street, or driving an auto-
mobile, or using a telephone. It must, however,
be an act which follows and tends toward accom-
plishment of the plan or scheme, and must be know-
ingly done in furtherance of some object or purpose
of the conspiracy charged in the indictment.
See, e.g., Jordan v. United States, 370 F.2d 126 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033 (1967); Hansen v.
United States, 326 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1963). Very little
is needed to constitute an overt act. See, e.g., Bartoli v.
United States, 192 F. 2d 130 (4th Cir. 1951) (telephone
conversation).
' See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964); ARIz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-332 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 184 (West
1970); ILL. R.v. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-2 (1969); N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 105.20 (McKinney 1967). See generally Note,
Criminal Conspiracy: Bearing of Overt Acts upon the
Nature of the Crime, 37 HA~v. L. REv. 1121 (1924);
Comment, The "Overt Act" in Conspiracy, 18 BROOK-
LYN L. REv. 263 (1952) (discussion of overt act require-
ment under New York law).
10 See Black v. United States, 252 F.2d 93, 94 (9th
Cir. 1958), where the court stated: "While the law re-
quires overt acts to complete criminal conspiracies, the
essence of the offense of the conspiracy, that which is
punished, is the 'agreement.'" The agreement repre-
sents the actualization of the intent. It is the act which
expresses in concrete form the threat to society of an
intent shared by two or more persons. Vicarious liabil-
ity is imputed and hearsay evidence admitted, statute
of limitations tolled and venue attained-all by virtue
of the terms of that agreement.
" See, e.g., Rizzo v. United States, 304 F.2d 810 (8th
Cir. 1962); Isaacs v. United States, 301 F.2d 706 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962). See generally
Comment, Conspiracy-Character of Agreement--Tacit
Consent, 2 ViL.. L. REv. 230 (1957).
12See Blumenthal v. United States, 158 F.2d 883
(9th Cir. 1946), aj'd, 332 U.S. 539 (1947). In United
States v. Bazzell, 187 F.2d 878, 884 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951), the Seventh Circuit stated:
The conspiracy remains none the less a crime be-
cause by its success an additional crime has been
committed.... Consequently, the substantive of-
fense is not merged in the charge of conspiracy...
and the parties may be punished for their agree-
ment to commit a crime as well as for the com-
pleted crime.
a criminal offense in the assumption that group
action toward an unlawful end presents a special
danger to the general public' Under this assump-
tion, not only does concerted action increase the
chances of success, it also increases the extent of
potential harm. 4 Group action can expand both
the scope and the complexity of the criminal under-
taking. Group pressure also tends to prevent with-
drawal and to inhibit disclosure.Y' Although the
more participants in an activity, the greater the
chance for infiltration by informers, or "leaks," the
secret nature of a conspiracy 16 is thought to mini-
mize possible detection by such 'eaks." It is pre-
cisely this difficulty of detection and proof which
has given rise to the flexibility and latitude ac-
corded the judge in admitting evidence in a con-
spiracy trial.
7
A second justification for conspiracy is derived
1" See Developments, supra note 7, at 923-25. As Judge
Coffin summarized in his dissent to United States v.
Spock, 416 F.2d at 184:
[T]he core idea underlying' the conspiracy theory is
that disciplined, concerted action poses a greater
threat to society than does individual or uncoor-
dinated group effort in that larger numbers permit
a division of labor, and discipline makes withdrawal
from the enterprise less likely.
14 See Woods v. United States, 240 F.2d 37 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
" On the difficulty of detection of conspiracies, the
Supreme Court noted in United States v. Rabinowich,
238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915):
For two or more to confederate and combine to-
gether to commit or cause to be committed a breach
of the criminal laws, is an offense of the gravest
character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury
to the public, the mere commission of the con-
templated crime. It involves deliberate plotting to
subvert the laws, educating and preparing the con-
spirators for further and habitual criminal prac-
tices. And it is characterized by secrecy, rendering
it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its
discovery, and adding to the importance of punish-
ing it when discovered.
06 "Secrecy and concealment are essential features of
successful conspiracy. The more completely they are
achieved, the more successful the crime." Blumenthal v.
United States, 332 U.S. at 557. But see United States v.
Spock, 416 F.2d 165, where the First Circuit stated that
secrecy is not an essential element of a conspiracy. The
purpose may be to commit open violations of the law.
17 For example, circumstantial evidence of con-
spiracies is said to be much favored by the courts:
It should be borne in mind that in a conspiracy
case wide latitute is allowed in presenting evidence
and it is within the discretion of the trial court to
admit evidence which even remotely tends to
establish the conspiracy charged.
Shine v. United States, 209 F.2d 67, 74 (9th Cir. 1954).
See also Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 Mico. L.
REv. 1159, 1160 (1954); see generally Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914).
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from agency principles. In defining conspiracy as a
"partnership in criminal purposes," 18 courts have
held that each conspirator becomes the agent of his
fellow conspirators upon joining the conspiracy.
9
The agency theory in conspiracy "partnerships"
imposes a stricter vicarious liability upon the
"partners" than the law of agency imposes upon
legitimate partnerships. Thus, a defendant may be
a co-conspirator of persons whom he does not
know. 0 He need not know the full extent or the
entire scope of the conspiracy in order to be guilty. 1
Furthermore, by joining the conspiracy, a de-
fendant may be deemed responsible for an act
which preceded his entry, even if he had no knowl-
edge of the act."
These, then, are the two theories-difficulty of
proof of conspiracies and the application of strin-
gent principles of partnership and agency law-
which underlie the conspiracy crime and the co-
conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule. In-
herent in the exception is the assumption that
when a conspiracy is established, everything said,
written, or done by any of the conspirators in fur-
therance of the common design is deemed to have
been said, done, or written by every one of them
and may be proved against each.P It is through
this door that much hearsay testimony is admitted
into evidence in a conspiracy trial.
IsSee Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644
(1946); United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608
(1910).
19 See Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967
(2d Cir. 1926).
20 See Lefco v. United States, 74 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir.
1934).
1 See United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 848-49
(2d Cir. 1938); Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d 691,
696 (9th Cir. 1937).
2 See cases cited at note 23 infra.
2 See Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967
(2d Cir. 1926):
Such declarations are admitted upon no doctrine
of the law of evidence, but of the substantive law of
the crime. When men enter into an agreement for
an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one
another, and have made 'a partnership in crime.'
What one does pursuant to tWeir common purpose,
all do, and, as declarations may be such acts, they
are competent against all.
See also Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925);
Wiiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632 (1896).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) provides:
Two or more defendants may be charged in the
same indictment or information if they are alleged
to have participated in the same act or transaction
or in the same series of acts or transactions con-
stituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants
may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all of the defendants need not be
charged in each count.
Tan HEARSAY RuLE
The hearsay rule as conventionally stated
24
excludes out-of-court assertions2 offered as evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
26
For example, suppose that in the trial of Jones for
the murder of Smith, a witness testifies that the
deceased, shortly before his death, stated that
"Jones shot me, my time is up." If the issue is the
identity of Smith's murderer, the witness' testi-
mony is hearsay and inadmissible unless it belongs
within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
The hearsay rule reflects the belief that some
evidence which might be of probative value should
not be admitted unless the declarant has actually
appeared in court and has been cross-examined
under oath with regard to his sincerity, memory,
perception and ability to communicate.2 As
McCormick points out, the exclusionary rule is
predicated on the fear that hearsay evidence is
untrustworthy because any one or more of three
guarantees of trustworthiness may be lacking:
1) the administration of an oath; 2) the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine; and 3) the opportunity
for the trier of fact to observe the demeanor of the
declarant if hearsay evidence is -used.2N
2 The authors of a recent casebook devote approxi-
mately forty pages to the rationale and meaning of the
hearsay rule. D. LouisELL, J. KJLPLAN & J. WALTZ,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 50-99 (1968).25 The word "assertion" is used instead of "state-
ment" to emphasize that hearsay may be non-verbal.
C. McCoRiCK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW Or EViDENCE
§ 225 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK]. Cf.
ComIaT ON RvLEs or PRAcn AiN PRocEDuRE
OF T=a JUDICIML. CONFERENCE OF THE UNiTIED STATES,
1971 REVISED ,DRAFT OF PROPOSED RuLES or EVI-
DENCE FOR ThE UNITED STATES DsTmicx CouaTs A D
MAGiSTRATES, Rule 801(a) (2) (1971) [hereinafter cited.
as PRoP. FED. R. Evm.].
21 The definition used is essentially that found in
LOuISELL, el aL, supra note 24, at 56. See also CAL.
EvmD. CODE § 1200 (West 1966). Wigmore does not at-
tempt to define hearsay in his treatise on evidence. 5 J.
WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1360-66 (3d ed. 1940) [herein-
after cited as WiGoRE]. McCormick offers a definition,
but warns that not too much should be expected from
any definition. McCo.mscx § 225. PROF. FED. R.
EvTD. 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement other
than one made by the declarant at the trial or hearing
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."
2See PROF. FED. R. Evm., Introductory Note to
Article VIII; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Applica-
tion of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HA~v. L. REv 177
(1948); Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule
and Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 484, 485 (1937);
Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REv.
331 (1961).
2McCoRmcn § 224. See also PRoF. FED. R. Evm.,
Introductory Note to Article VIII; Universal Camera
Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 495-96 (1951); see
1972]
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Of these three indicia of trustworthiness, the
absence of an opportunity to cross-examine is the
principal justification for the rule excluding hear-
say evidence.29 Cross-examination is the primary
legal instrument for testing the accuracy of a de-
clarant's perception, memory, and ability to com-
municate. 0 While undergoing cross-examination,
the declarant may be required to explain ambigu-
ous, unclear or inconsistent testimony. Personality
traits that influence his thinking and judgment
may be disclosed. Questions may probe his state of
mind at the time of perception, and numerous
other factors which affect a declarant's mental
processes may be investigated. The witness who
reports hearsay statements can usually provide
the judge and the jury with none of this informa-
tion.3' Thus, the fear of untrustworthiness upon
which the hearsay rule is founded seems to require
the exclusion of all out-of-court assertions offered
as proof if the declarant does not appear in court.
Although the hearsay rule is founded upon the
notion that "a mere hearsay is no evidence," 32
exceptions to the hearsay rule have been recog-
nized by the law for as long as the rule itself has
existed.33 Indeed, the nature of the hearsay rule is
difficult to ascertain because there are so many
exceptions. Many legal scholars have offered
explanations of the rule and its exceptions, some
with an eye to rationalization. Wigmore suggested
that the exceptions attempt to accommodate two
interests: the reliability of33 and necessity for3'
particular evidence. Maguire adds a third interest,
one which is said to reflect the demands of the
adversary system.36
generally Sahm, Demeanor Evidence: Elusive and In-
tangible Imponderables, 47 A.B.A.J. 580 (1961).
21 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970);
McCoRmcK § 224; 5 WimoxE § 1367; Morgan, supra
note 27; PROP. FED. R. Evm., Introductory Note to
Article VIII.
"0 See authorities cited at note 29 supra.
31 See, e.g., Coleman v. Southwick, 9 John. 50 (N.Y.
1812), quoted in 5 WIGMoE § 1362:
A person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to
enter into any particulars, to answer any questions,
to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradic-
tions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any
ambiguities; he entrenches himself in the simple
assertion that he was told so, and leaves the burden
entirely on his dead or absent author.
2B. GILBERT, EvIDENCE 152 (2d ed. 1769).
"5 WiGRoEx § 1397. See also Morgan, supra note 27.
14 5 WiGmORE § 1422.
3 Id. § 1421.
31J. MAGULIRE, EvIDENcE: COMMON SENSE AID
COmMON LAW 140-44 (1947). Maguire offers "adversary
practice" as a third "motive" or reason for the "fabrica-
tion" of common law hearsay exceptions. 5 WiGO0RE
§§ 1430-52; McCoRmIcK §§ 258-64.
It is beyond the scope of this article to rationalize
the hearsay rule and its exceptions. It may be said,
however, that the rule exists in the context of an
adversary system which requires that proof of
disputed facts be of a quality which satisfies the
litigants that the means of reaching a decision are
fair." This need not require determination of any-
thing approaching "truth" in an absolute sense.
In this context, the hearsay rule may be viewed
as predicated upon one or more of four considera-
tions:"s
1. To exclude evidence because, although
relevant, its probative value is too slight to
justify the time and expense to be spent in re-
ceiving it;
2. To exclude evidence because it has such a
tendency to prejudice or to confuse that its use
would probably do more harm than good;
3. To exclude evidence because it may be
false, and because the opposite party could not
be prepared to meet and rebut it;
4. To exclude evidence because it is inferior
to other evidence which could have been pro-
duced.
Not all exceptions to the hearsay rule may be ra-
tionalized by any single one of these theories, but
it is submitted that any exception may be ra-
tionaliz6d by one or more of them.
TiE Co-CoNSPrRATORS EXCEPTION
The co-conspirators exception, like other excep-
tions to the hearsay rule, is purportedly founded
on considerations of the declaration's probable
reliability and the need for it as evidence. As the
exception is usually formulated, "any act or
declaration by one co-conspirator committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy and during its pend-
ency is admissible against each and every co-
conspirator provided that a foundation for its
reception is laid by independent proof of the con-
spiracy." '9 According to this definition, three
conditions must be satisfied before hearsay evi-
dence is deemed admissable: 1) furtherance;
4
7See Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 Iow.x
L. RE v. 331, 335 (1961).
1 See James, The Role of Hearsay in a Rational
Scheme of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REV. 788, 790-91 (1940).
" Levie, supra note 17, at 1161. See also Carbo v.
United States, 314 F.2d 718, 735, 735 n. 21 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); De'elopmcnts,
supra note 7, at 985.
40 Under the furtherance requirement, the declara-
tion must relate in content to the conspiracy, and must
be made with the intent to advance the objects of the
conspiracy. Many jurisdictions have applied the re-
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2) pendency;" and 3) foundation or independent
proof of the existence of the conspiracy and the
connection of the declarant and defendant with
it.4 This hearsay exception has long been ac-
cepted 43 and its continued vitality is amply il-
lustrated by the reported cases.A
One justification offered in support of the co-
conspirators exception is that, because the crime
of conspiracy is difficult to prove, a co-conspira-
tor's direct testimony is needed. Frequently, the
only direct evidence of a conspiracy is the in-
dividual conspirator's words and deeds during
the conspiracy. Thus, unless a conspirator is will-
ing to testify against his co-conspirators, the
prosecution must rely heavily on circumstantial
evidence. In such cases the jury is asked to draw
an inference of agreement from conduct which
seems to follow some plan. However, the use of
circumstantial evidence is subject to inherent
limitations. If the conspiracy is discovered early
or is discontinued, there may be very little conduct
from which to draw an inference. Moreover, the
alleged conspirators may present reasonable ex-
planations for their conduct, thereby making it
difficult to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.4"
Because it is usually more difficult to establish a
conspiracy inferentially from circumstantial evi-
quirement so broadly that anything related to the con-
spiracy is found to be in furtherance of its objectives.
Levie, supra note 17, at 1168. The Seventh Circuit has
interpreted the requirement to mean only that the act
with which the declaration is concerned must be in
furtherance of the conspiracy. International Indemnity
Co. v. Lehman, 28 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 278
U.S. 648 (1928), discussed in Developments, supra note
7, 985-86.
It Under the pendency requirement, the declaration
must have been made after the formation and before the
termination of the conspiracy. Levie, supra note 17, at
1172-75; Developments, supra note 7, at 986-87. Com-
pare this with the Georgia exception, which encom-
passes declarations made during the concealment phase
of the conspiracy which was the subject of the Supreme
Court's decision in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970). See discussion accompanying note 181 infra.
4Levie, supra note 17, at 1176-78; Developments,
supra note 7, at 987.
4See United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
460 (1827).
It is difficult to find a conspiracy case in which some
question involving this hearsay exception is not raised
by one of the defendants. See, e.g., United States v.
Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969) (Independent
proof of the conspiracy is established by a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence independent of the hearsay
utterances); Howell v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1017
(N.D. Ill. 1969) (Defendant's state arrest for illegal
possession of narcotics was not a withdrawal from a
narcotics conspiracy so as to render co-conspirators'
subsequent declarations inadmissible against defen-
dant).
45 See Levie. subra note 17. at 1160.
dence than to establish a conspiracy by direct or
testimonial evidence, need for direct evidence is
relied upon as a principal justification for the co-
conspirator's exception.
A second justification for the co-conspirators
exception is the belief that a co-conspirator's testi-
mony is probably reliable. In arguing for the ad-
mission of co-conspirators' hearsay statements on
the basis of trustworthiness, some courts and
authorities have analogized to other hearsay ex-
ceptions.46 Such comparisons have been criticized,
however.4 One criticism is that treating these
statements as vicarious admissions confuses the
relationship among conspirators with that of
principal and agent. Courts generally admit into
evidence vicarious admissions on the ground that
a principal's substantive responsibility for his
agent's acts involves an evidential responsibility
for his agent's statements. 49 But the practical
considerations which justify forcing a principal to
adopt, for business and evidence purposes,5" the
statements of his authorized agent 51 do not apply
to a conspiracy because its members often lack
the power to control or authorize other members'
actions. 52 Even though the substantive law of con-
spiracy holds one conspirator accountable for all
"See, e.g., Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961
(2d Cir. 1926) (vicarious admissions); Shea v. United
States, 251 F. 440 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 581
(1918) (res gestae); 4 WIoMoRE §§ 1077, 1079, 1080a
(agency, vicarious admissions).
4T See Levie, supra note 17, 1161-67; Morgan, The
Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 H.Av. L. REv.
461 (1929); Developments, supra note 7, at 988-89;
Note, The Hearsay Exception, for Co-Conspirators'
Declarations, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 530 (1958); PROP.
FrD. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(v),Adv. Comm. Note, at 104.
"The usual phrasing of the rule makes admissible
against the principal the utterances of the agent made
within the scope of his authority or employment. As
Wigmore stated:
So far as one person is privy in obligation with an-
other, i.e., is liable to be affected in his obligation
under the substantive law by the acts of the other,
there is equal reason for receiving against him such
admissions of the other as furnish evidence of the
act which charges them equally.
4 WiGmozE § 1077. See, e.g., Gambino v. United States,
108 F.2d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 1939).
4 See 4 WIGmoRE § 1079.
10 The test of admissibility is whether the agent was
authorized to make, on the principal's behalf, state-
ments concerning the subject matter. The policy behind
the exception is to prevent businessmen who act through
agents from avoiding liability which would be imposed
on businessmen acting on their own behalf. Note, supra
note 47, at 535.
51 See United States v. Miller, 246 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 905 (1957). See generally Morgan,
supra note 47.
12See id. at 481; Note, supra note 47, at 535.
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acts done during the conspiracy,D it does not follow
that the hearsay statements of one conspirator
are inevitably trustworthy.
Wigmore justified the admission into evidence
of co-conspirators' hearsay statements on the
premise that all participants in a conspiracy have
an "identity of interest." -' He stated that:
A conspiracy makes each conspirator liable under
the criminal law for the acts of every other con-
spirator done in pursuance of the conspiracy.
Consequently, by the principle already exemplified
in other relations..., the admissions of a co-con-
spirator may be used to affect the proof against the
others, on the same conditions as his acts when
used to create their legal liability.55
Wigmore's mention of "other relations" refers to
those situations where "one person is privy in
obligation with another." 56 As an additional
ground, Wigmore would admit co-conspirators'
hearsay statements on the theory of vicarious lia-
bility. Moreover, he argued that an admission of
one conspirator against his interest is against the
interest of all conspirators.5 7 But as one writer has
said:
[Wigmore's explanation] fails to distinguish be-
tween declarations showing the existence of a con-
spiracy and declarations concerning membership
or aims. Of course sane men do not falsely admit to
conspiracy. Conspirators' declarations are good to
prove that some conspiracy exists but less trust-
worthy to show its aims and membership. The con-
spirator's interest is likely to lie in misleading the
listener into believing the conspiracy stronger with
more members (and different members) and other
aims than it in fact has. It is no victory for common
sense to make a belief that criminals are notorious
for their veracity the basis for law.u
While these justifications supporting the co-
conspirator's exception can be criticized, it does
seem that the requirement of independent proof of
the conspiracy supplies a probability of trust-
worthiness. Important issues remain, however.
Ultimately there is a question whether the inde-
pendent proof requirement supplies sufficient
trustworthiness to obviate the necessity of afford-
ing defendant an opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant. Another crucial issue is whether
53See Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d at 967.
54 4 WIGORE § 1079.
r5 Id.
56 id. § 1077.
57 Id. § 1080a.
'8 Levie, supra note 17, at 1165-67.
judge or jury should make the determination of
independent proof. Finally, additional issues to be
resolved are the standard of proof to be used by
the trier of fact and the proper time for the deter-
mination to be made. These issues are the primary
focus of the discussion which follows. Since the
problems raised by the requirement of independent
proof begin at the trial level, the next section
starts with an examination of the judge's instruc-
tions to the jiury.
I. Tn ROLE OP THE JUDGE AND THE JURY IN
MAKING THE PRELIMINARY
FACT DETERMINATIONS
One of the most significant decisions dealing
with the co-conspirators exception to the hearsay
rule is Carbo v. United States.59 There the appel-
lants, defendants below, argued that the district
court had erred in rejecting the following instruc-
tion to the jury:
You will recall that testimony of acts and state-
ments made by alleged co-conspirators in the ab-
sence of a defendant was received on a tentative
basis in evidence. Such testimony was received
subject to independent proof of the existence of the
conspiracy and the absent defendant's knowing
participation in the conspiracy. If you do not find,
on independent proof, that a conspiracy existed
and the absent defendant knowingly participated
in the conspiracy, the tentative basis is destroyed
and all such testimony must be ignored as to him.
A defendant's connection with a conspiracy must
be established beyond a reasonable doubt, accord-
ingly, by his own conduct and his own statements
or declarations.10
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's re-
jection of appellants' proposed instruction. The
main issue in Carbo was whether the finding of
independent proof of a conspiracy and the de-
59 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cerl. denied, 377 U.S.
953 (1964). The appellants, Carbo, Palermo, Dragno,
Sica and Gibson, were convicted of extortion affecting
interstate commerce, and conspiracy to extort, in the
Southern District of California. The statutes involved
were: 18 U.S.C. §§ 875(b) (1964) (interstate transmis-
sion of threats and conspiracy to transmit threats), 1951
(extortion affecting interstate commerce), and 371
(conspiracy to commit an offense against the United
States). The appellants had attempted to gain manage-
rial control of a well-known professional boxer, who at
that time was a top contender for the welterweight
crown. By bringing pressure to bear oa this fighter',
manager, the appellants would control the welterweight
crown, since they already dominated the other top con-
tenders.
10 Id. at 735.
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fedant's participation in it was to be made by the
judge or by the jury." Appellants argued that
before the jury could integrate the challenged
hearsay testimony and weigh it with the other
evidence, it must first make an independent finding
both that a conspiracy existed and that the declar-
ant and the other defendants were parties. More-
over, appellants contended that the jury must
make such findings beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Ninth Circuit rejected appellants' conten-
tions. Judge Merrill, writing for the court, held
that to require the jury to make findings of the
existence of a conspiracy and the accused's par-
ticipation in it beyond a reasonable doubt, with-
out relying on the hearsay evidence, would render
consideration of the hearsay evidence unneces-
sary. - To do so would be tantamount to the trial
judge telling the jury "you may not consider this
evidence unless you first find the defendant
guilty." 6 Instead of treating it as a question of the
required burden of proof, the court characterized
the issue as one of "admissibility of evidence." If
it was required that the jury, applying the reason-
able doubt test, must make the preliminary finding
of independent proof of conspiracy, then the
preliminary question and the ultimate question of
guilt or innocence on the conspiracy charge would
coincide, with the result that the co-conspirators'
hearsay testimony would not be considered on the
question of guilt. The court rejected that result,
saying: "the declarations, if admissible, shall be
considered by the jury in reaching its determina-
tion upon the issue of innocence or guilt." '
The Carbo court also rejected appellants' further
contention that the jury should have decided the
preliminary question of the existence of sufficient
independent proof of the conspiracy, and of de-
clarant's and defendant's connection with it, on
the basis of a prima facie case rather than proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The court noted:
The jury is already concerned with the evidence-
weighing standards involved in proof beyond a
"See, e.g., Rizzo v. United States, 418 F.2d 71 (7th
Cir. 1969); United States v. Lawler, 413 F.2d 622 (7th
Cir. 1969).
12314 F.2d at 736.
3Id. The court in Carbo noted that an identical
argument had been rejected previously by the Second
Circuit in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 230-31
(2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), where the
court stated that such requirement of an independent
finding by the jury "altogether withdrew the declara-
tions from the jury, and it was idle to put them in at
all."
A 314 F.2d at 736.
reasonable doubt. To expect them not only to com-
partmentalize the evidence separating that pro-
duced by the declarations from all other, but as
well to apply to the independent evidence the en-
tirely different evidence-weighing standards re-
quired of a prima facie case, is to expect the im-
possible. 6"
In rejecting appellants' argument that the jury
should decide the preliminary question, the court
held that the judge, not the jury, is to determine
admissibility of co-conspirators' hearsay state-
ments." Once hearsay statements are admitted
into evidence by the trial judge, the jury can con-
sider them together with any other evidence on
the issue of guilt. Carbo thus reaffirmed the so-
called orthodox rule on allocation of functions be-
tween judge and jury. According to this view, the
judge decides preliminary questions of fact upon
which competence depends, and the jury deter-
mines the weight to be given the evidence once
admitted."
In affirming the district court's rejection of
appellants' proposed instruction, however, the
Ninth Circuit failed to clarify the confusion arising
from the similarity between the rejected instruc-
tion and the instruction actually given."8 For exam-
ple, as to appellant Gibson, the lower court charged
the jury:
You are instructed that in considering the guilt
or innocence of the defendant Gibson you may not
consider the words or conduct of any other de-
fendant not in the presence of Mr. Gibson unless
you find that the prosecution has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Gibson entered into a
conspiracy with that defendant as charged in the
indictment, and that the words of the other de-
:6 Id. at 737.
6 Id.
6Id. The Carbo court again cited Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in United States v. Dennis with ap-
proval on the question of allocation of functions be-
tween judge and jury, where he stated:
The law is indeed not wholly clear as to who must
decide whether such a declaration may be used; but
we think that the better doctrine is that the judge is
always to decide, as concededly he generally must,
any issues of fact on which the competence of evi-
dence depends, and that, if he decides it to be com-
petent, he is to leave it to the jury to use like any
other evidence, without instructing them to con-
sider it as proof only after they too have decided a
preliminary issue which alone makes it competent.
Indeed, it is a practical impossibility for laymen,
and for that matter, for most judges, to keep their
minds in the isolated compartments that this re-
quires.
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 231.
"3 314 F.2d at 735 n. 20.
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fendant were spoken in aid of and to further the
purpose of the conspiracy. 69
And, with regard to appellant Palermo, the trial
court charged:
Now, before you can hold any one of these de-
fendants to be bound by this conversation with Mr.
Palermo, if you believe that there was such a con-
versation, it would be necessary for you to find
from other evidence that such person, as to whom
you are making applicable that conversation, was
in fact a conspirator.70
If the words "from other evidence" in the above
instruction have substantially the same meaning
as the phrase "on independent proof" in the re-
jected instruction,n and a literal interpretation
indicates that they do, the two sets of instructions
are identical. Therefore, the criticism of the pro-
posed instruction could also be leveled at the
instruction actually given. But although the
Ninth Circuit affirmed, it did not necessarily ap-
prove the lower court's instruction. Instead, it
noted only that while such an instruction was not
necessary, it was nevertheless not error to include
it in the charge to the jury because it was in ap-
pellants' favor.n
Not only was there still considerable confusion
as to the proper content of a trial court's instruc-
tion, but Carbo also left two additional problems
unresolved: the standard to be used by the trial
judge and the proper time for the judge to deter-
mine the admissibility of co-conspirators' testi-
mony. As to the proper standard for admissibility,
it has been held that a prima facie showing of a
defendant's membership in a conspiracy by inde-
pendent evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to
consider an alleged co-conspirator's acts and
statements as evidence against the defendant.3






2 Id. at 737-38.73 See, e.g., Orser v. United States, 362 F.2d 580 (5th
Cir. 1966); National Dairy Products Corp. v. United
States, 350 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1965), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 384 U.S. 883 (1966); United
States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965).
74 314 F.2d at 737 (emphasis added):
It is for the judge then, and not for the jury, to
determine the admissibility of the declarations. In
making this determination the test is not whether
the defendants' connection had by independent
evidence been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
but whether, accepting the independent evidence
more recent case, however, the Second Circuit
ignored the prima facie test and instead phrased
the standard in terms of "preponderance" of the
evidence:
[Tihe judge must determine, when all the evidence
is in, whether in his view the prosecution has
proved participation in the conspiracy, by the de-
fendant against whom the hearsay is offered, by a
fair preponderance of the evidence independent of
the hearsay utterances.7'
The question thus raised is whether it makes a
difference if the "preponderance" as opposed to
prima facie standard is used.
Prima facie evidence is that which, unless re-
butted by sufficient evidence to the contrary, is
adequate to support but does not compel a con-
clusion based on it.76 In a conspiracy case, it is
independent proof of a defendant's participation in
the conspiracy which creates a reasonable inference
sufficient to support a finding of guilt. On the
other hand, the "preponderance" of the evidence
standard requires that evidence in support of a
proposition be of greater weight or more convinc-
ing than that offered in opposition. The "pre-
ponderance" test is met if the evidence on the
whole shows that the fact or causation sought to
be proved is more probable than not?7
Comparing the two standards, the "prepon-
derance" test seems to place a more difficult
burden on the prosecutor because it requires the
judge to "weigh" the evidence and determine that
proof that a defendafnt was a conspirator is more
convincing than evidence to the contrary. In addi-
tion it should be noted that since there must be
contradictory evidence for the judge to "weigh,"
use of the "preponderance" standard may shift to
defendant the burden of going forward with the
evidence. In this way, the "preponderance"
standard can create additional burdens for both
prosecution and defense.
Unlike the "preponderance" standard, the
prima facie standard does not seem to call for a
weighing of the evidence offered to prove defend-
as credible, the judge is satisfied that a prima facie
case (one which would support a finding) has been
made. Thereafter it is the jury's function to deter-
mine whether the evidence, including the declara-
tions, is credible and convincing beyond a reason-
able doubt.7
6
5 United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d
Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).
76McCoasncK § 53.
- Id. § 319.
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ant's participation in a conspiracy. Instead, the
prosecutor need only present independent evidence
tending to show that defendant was a conspirator.
On the basis of this evidence alone, the judge de-
cides whether to admit the challenged co-con-
spirators' hearsay testimony. If the judge admits
the hearsay evidence, the alleged conspirator must
then contradict it.78 Therefore, because no weighing
of defendant's contradictory evidence is involved,
the prima facie requirement resembles the first
stage of the "preponderance" test.
Despite these distinctions, however, there may
be no real difference between the two standards
as they are applied. When viewed from the posi-
tion of the trial judge, it may be difficult to say
more than that he must satisfy himself, as a rea-
sonable man, of a defendant's participation in the
conspiracy on the basis of non-hearsay evidence. 9
The second unresolved problem in Carbo is the
question of the proper time for the judge to ddcide
that co-conspirators' hearsay testimony will be
admitted into evidence. Because the judge has
discretion as to the order of trial, most courts hold
that hearsay can be admitted without a prior
prima facie showing of conspiracy and the declar-
ant's and the defendant's connection to it.80 Gen-
erally the judge will either admit the hearsay
statements, subject to a later motion by the prose-
cutor to apply them to all or certain defendants,
or admit the hearsay statements as to all defend-
ants, subject to a motion to strike if not "con-
nected up" by independent proof with all or cer-
tain defendants. Thus, the judge may postpone
his determination of the admissibility of co-con-
spirators' hearsay testimony until all the evidence
has been presented.
2
Despite the Ninth Circuit's disapproval of ap-
pellants' proposed instruction, conspiracy cases
subsequent to Carbo reveal that other federal
courts continue to charge juries with instructions
7 If the government fails to present prime facie proof
of a defendant's participation in a conspiracy, it seems
that the criminal proceeding against defendant should
be dismissed.
79 United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d
Cir. 1969).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Halpin, 374 F.2d 493,
495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1032 (1967);
Parenti v. United States, 249 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir.
1967); United States v. Sansone, 231 F.2d 887, 893 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 987 (1956).
"See United States v. Acuff, 410 F.2d 463, 465-66
(6th Cir. 1969); Enriquez v. United States, 314 F.2d
703 (9th Cir. 1963).
2 United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d
Cir. 1969).
similar to the rejected instructions in Carbo.P The
continued use of such instructions suggests that
Carbo is not being followed and that there must be
some justification for allowing the jury to decide
the preliminary questions of conspiracy on which
the admissibility of evidence depends. To seek
such a rationale it is necessary to reexamine the
role of the judge and jury in light of the cases
subsequent to Carbo and other recent develop-
ments in the law.
Recent appellate court decisions indicate that
Carbo is followed in the Second" and Ninth Cir-
cuits.85 Conspiracy cases in other federal jurisdic-
tions, however, illustrate that juries continue to
be charged with instructions similar to those re-
jected in Carbo.86 For example, in United States v.
Rizzo,87 the Seventh Circuit approved instructions
which advised the jury that it must first determine
whether the existence of a conspiracy was proved,
and then determine "from the acts and declara-
tions of each defendant whether he became a
participant in that conspiracy .... "I Further, the
instruction stated that "contingent upon the jury's
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt," that both facts
were proved, then all acts and declarations of each
co-conspirator could be admitted against all per-
sons whom the jury found to have joined in the
conspiracy.89
83See, e.g., Rizzo v. United States, 418 F.2d 71 (7th
Cir. 1969); United States v. Lawler, 413 F.2d 622
(7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015 (1967); National
Dairy Products Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 231
(8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20
(6th Cir. 1965), affd, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Dennis v.
United States, 346 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1965), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
8 See United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d 471, 479
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1967); United
States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 906 (1967).
85 314 F.2d at 735-38; see United States v. Knight,
416 F.2d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 1969); White v. United
States, 394 F.2d 49, 54 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Ragland, 375 F.2d at 478-79; United States v. Nuccio,
373 F.2d at 173; United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d at
230-31.8
6 See cases cited at note 83 supra.
- 418 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1969).
8, Id. at 82.
89 Id. (emphasis added). See also Dennis v. United
States, 346 F.2d 10, 16 (10th Cir. 1965), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 384 U.S. 855 (1966), where
the Tenth Circuit stated:
The jury was told they must first determine the
existence of the conspiracy charged, and if they en-
tertained a reasonable doubt of the conspiracy as
charged, their task was at an end, and they should
acquit all the defendants. But, if on the other hand,
they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
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Another decision which left a preliminary ques-
tion to the jury is United States v. Hoffa,90 where
the Sixth Circuit approved instructions restricting
the jury's consideration of out-of-court statements
as to the particular defendant who made the
statement, "until and unless the jury was satisfied
from other evidence in the case that the defendant
making the statement was a co-conspirator of one
or more of the other defendants .... The instruc-
tions made it clear that the other evidence could
not consist of hearsay declarations. 9 Finally, in
the existence of a conspiracy, they should then pro-
ceed to consider which, if any, of the appellants
were members of it. And, they should determine the
participation of any defendant in the conspiracy
from the evidence relating to his own acts, declara-
tions and conduct with the actions and conduct of
others; that guilt was personal and individual, but
once a conspiracy was formed each member became
the agent of the other in all things done or said in
furtherance or in promotion of the unlawful pur-
pose. [emphasis added].
See also United States v. Lawler, 413 F.2d at 628; White
v. United States, 394 F.2d at 54; National Dairy
Products Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 231.
10 349 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1965).
91 Id. at 41. See also United States v. Stromberg, 268
F.2d 256, 265, 265 n. 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
863 (1959), where the Second Circuit quoted from the
trial judge's instructions:
'In your consideration, then, of the evidence you
should first determine whether or not the con-
spiracy to import and distribute existed as charged
in the indictment. If you conclude that such con-
spiracy did exist, you should next determine as to
each defendant separately whether or not he or she
was a party to or member of the conspiracy with
knowledge of its illegal purpose and with the inten-
tion to assist the conspiracy to achieve its illegal
objective.
'In considering whether or not a particular de-
fendant was a member of the conspiracy, you must
do so without regard to and independently of the
statements or declarations of others. That is to say,
you must determine the issue as to his or her mem-
bership in the conspiracy from his or her own
statements or declarations or acts or conduct.
'If and when the existence of the conspiracy
charged in the indictment and the membership of
any or all of the defendants in such conspiracy has
been found, then the acts done and the statements
or declarations made by any person found by you
to be a member of the conspiracy may be considered
in connection with the case as to any defendant
whom you find to have been a member of the con-
spiracy even though such acts and declarations
may have been made in the absence and without
the knowledge of such defendant, provided such
acts were done and such statements or declarations
were made during the continuance of such con-
spiracy and in furtherance of an objective or pur-
pose of the conspiracy.
'So, if you conclude from the evidence that a de-
fendant was a member of the conspiracy and you do
so based upon the independent evidence, as I have
already told you, based upon his own acts or her
own acts or her declarations, or her or his conduct,
United Stales v. Ragland,9 the Second Circuit
noted with approval that the trial judge, without
expressly finding that a conspiracy had been
proved, told the jury that it could consider co-
conspirators' hearsay statements "if it first found
a prima facie case of conspiracy to have been
established." 93
Because they allow the jury to decide the pre-
liminary question upon which admissibility de-
pends, the above instructions reject the belief ex-
pressed in Carbo that the jury should not become
involved in the technical niceties of foundational
questions. It is therefore disappointing that the
federal courts which have continued to use such
instructions seldom attempt to explain why. The
cases and the commentators, however, do suggest
three possible reasons. First, the use of such in-
structions is merely "harmless error." 94 Second,
the admissibility of the co-conspirators' hearsay
evidence turns on relevancy, rather than compe-
tency, and therefore the existence of the prelimi-
nary fact (essential for the disputed evidence to
be relevant) is for the jury to determineP6 Third,
to allow the judge finally to determine the existence
of the preliminary fact would deprive an alleged
conspirator of his constitutional right to trial by
jury.9' Each of these suggested reason will be con-
sidered separately.
HARMLESS ERROR
Some courts, while affirming the use of instruc-
tions which require that the jury find a conspiracy
before it considers the hearsay statements, have
stated that such instructions constitute mere
"harmless error." 97 Since the trial judge has at-
you may then consider as if made by him or her
any statements or declarations of other members of
the conspiracy, even though they are not named as
defendants in the indictment, provided such state-
ments or declarations were made during the exist-
ence of the conspiracy and in furtherance of an ob-
ject or purpose of the conspiracy as charged in the
indictment.'
See United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 892,
903 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
92 375 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1967).
9 Id. at 478-79.
1 Id. See also United States v. Knight, 416 F.2d at
1186; White v. United States, 394 F.2d at 54; United
States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d at 173; United States v.
Stadter, 336 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1964); United States
v. Stromberg, 268 F.2d at 266.
95 See PROP. FED. R. Evi. 104, Adv. Comm. Note
at 11-14 (1971); CAL. Evm. CODE § 403, Assem. Comm.
Comment (West 1966).
91 See authorities cited at note 95 supra.
91 See cases cited at note 94 supra.
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ready determined the admissibility of the chal-
lenged co-conspirators' hearsay testimony, these
instructions unnecessarily give the jury an op-
portunity to "second-guess" his decision, and are
"uriduly generous" to a defendant.58 Thus, the
courts have held that "[ain error of this sort, so
favoring a defendant, provides no basis for a
reversal of a judgment of conviction entered upon
the jury verdict." 99
RELEVANCY VERSUS COMPETENCY
This rationale takes issue with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's statement in Carbo that co-conspirators'
hearsay evidence is "concededly relevant but
challenged under a technical evidentiary rule of
competence .... "100 Its proponents argue that
the relevancy,' 0' rather than the competency, 102 of
co-Conspirators' hearsay evidence depends on the
existence of the preliminary fact.i °3 Relevant evi-
dence is evidence which has any tendency to make
the existence of any fact of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.104
In the context of the co-conspirators exception to
the hearsay rule, one might view the independent
proof requirement as a parallel to the preliminary
fact requirement in a relevancy problem. In other
words, if there is no conspiracy proven and if the
declarant is not shown to be a party to it, then his
declarations are not probative of conspiracy as to
alleged co-conspirators. Proponents of the rele-
vancy rationale admit that where the competency
of an item of evidence depends upon the existence
of a disputed fact, the orthodox rule applies and
the question is one of admissibility to be deter-
91 See cases cited at note 94 supra.
9 United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d at 479.
100 314 F.2d at 736.
101 Relevant evidence is evidence which is pertinent
or applicable in determining a fact in question. It is
evidence having probative value in proving or disprov-
ing a point. It is evidence which tends to render proba-
ble a certain inference involved in a case. McCoRmcK
§§ 151 ef seq. See also PRoP. FED. R. Evm. 401, at 28.
112 Competent evidence is evidence which is legally
adequate and sufficient. Competency of evidence con-
cerns its reliability rather than its bearing upon the
issues. McCoRmIcK §§ 151 et seq.
103 See CAL. Evm. CODE § 403, Assem. Comm. Com-
ment (West 1966). See generally Maguire & Epstein,
Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admis-
sibility of Evidence, 40 HAuRv. L. REv. 392 (1927);
Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determnina-
lion of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L.
REv. 165 (1929).
104 PROP. FED. R. EviD. 401.
mined by the judge. 05 They also point out, how-
ever, that where the relevancy of the evidence
turns on the existence of a preliminary fact, the
authorities generally agree that the question of the
existence of the preliminary fact is for the jury. 06
Support for this rationale is found in the As-
sembly Committee's Comments to Section 403 of
the California Evidence Code.107 Section 403 pro-
vides in part:
(a) The proponent of the proffered evidence has
the burden of producing evidence as to the exist-
ence of the preliminary fact, and the proffered evi-
dence is inadmissible unless the court finds that
there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of
the existence of the preliminary fact, when:
(1) The relevance of the proffered evidence de-
pends on the existence of the preliminary fact;
(c) If the court admits the proffered evidence
under this section, the court:
(1) May, and on request shall, instruct the jury
to determine whether the preliminary fact exists
and to disregard the proffered evidence unless the
jury finds that the preliminary fact does exist.
(2) Shall instruct the jury to disregard the
proffered evidence if the court subsequently deter-
mines that a jury could not reasonably find that the
preliminary fact exists .... 10
In its Comments, the Assembly Committee offers
the admission of co-conspirators' hearsay evidence
as an example of the type of preliminary fact ques-
tions that should be decided under Section 403.109
It is unclear whether the preliminary fact ques-
tion of the existence of a conspiracy and a defend-
ant's participation in it is one of relevancy or
competency. The Assembly Committee notes that
it is often difficult to distinguish preliminary ques-
tions of fact on this basis."0 However, the rule
stated in Section 403 does eliminate uncertainty.'
'
05 See authorities cited at note 73 supra.
106 Id.
17 CAL. Evm. CODE § 403 (West 1966).
in8 Id.
109 Id. Assem. Comm. Comment.
"
0 Id. The Assembly Committee notes that:
It is difficult, however, to distinguish all prelimi-
nary fact questions upon this principle. And emi-
nent legal authorities sometimes differ over
whether a particular preliminary fact question is
one of relevancy or competency. For example,
Wigmore classifies admissions with questions of
relevancy (4 Wigmore, Evidence 1 (3d ed. 1940))
while Morgan classifies admissions with questions
of competency to be decided under the standard
prescribed in Section 405. (Morgan, Basic Problems
of Evidence 244 (1957)).
But see CAL. Evm. CODE § 405 (West 1966):
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Additional support for the "relevancy" rationale
appeared in the Preliminary Draft of the proposed
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates. 1 2 Rule 1-04 and the Advisory Com-
mittee's note adopted and cited Section 403 of the
California Evidence Code with apparent ap-
proval.113 Rule 1-04 provided in part:
(a) General Rule. Preliminary questions con-
cering... the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the judge, subject to the provisions
of subdivision (b)....
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. When the rele-
vancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of
a condition of fact, the judge shall admit it upon
the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a
finding of the fulfillment of the condition. If under
all the evidence upon the issue the jury might rea-
sonably find that the fulfillment of the condition is
not established, the judge shall instruct the jury to
consider the issue and to disregard the evidence un-
less they find the condition was fulfilled. If under
all the evidence upon the issue the jury could not
reasonably find that the condition was fulfilled, the
With respect to preliminary fact determinations not
governed by Section 403 or 404:
(a) When the existence of a preliminary fact is
disputed, the court shall indicate which party has
the burden of producing evidence and the burden
of proof on the issue as implied by the rule of law
under which the question arises. The court shall
determine the existence or nonexistence of the pre-
liminary fact and shall admit or exclude the
proffered evidence as required by the rule of law
under which the question arises.
(b) If a preliminary fact is also a fact in issue in
the action:
(1) The jury shall not be informed of the court's
determination as to the existence or nonexistence
of the preliminary fact.
(2) If the proffered evidence is admitted, the
jury shall not be instructed to disregard the evi-
dence if its determination of the fact differs from
the court's determination of the preliminary
fact....
1, Id. The California Committee states that:
To eliminate uncertainties of classification, sub-
division (a) lists the kinds of preliminary fact
questions that are to be determined under the
standard prescribed in Section 403. And to elimi-
nate any uncertainties that are not resolved by
this listing, various Evidence Code sections state
specifically that admissibility depends on 'evidence
sufficient to sustain a finding' of certain facts. See,
e.g., Evidence Code §§ 1222, 1223 [Admission of
co-conspirator], 1400.
" 2 COMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TH UNITED
STATES, PROPOSED RULES OF EvIDENCE FOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES,
46 F.R.D. 161 (Preliminary Draft, 1969) [hereinafter
cited as PRELI. DRAFT PROP. FED. R. EviD.].
"'Id. Rule 1-04, at 186-87, Adv. Comm. Note, at
187-90.
judge shall instruct the jury to disregard the evi-
dence .... 
11 4
The Revised Draft deleted everything from sub-
section (b) after the first sentence and the Advisory
Committee's Note reflects the deviation from the
California rule.11 5 Thus, the California rule will
not become the accepted procedure in all federal
jurisdictions if the Revised Proposed Rules are
adopted.
Moreover, )Proposed Federal Rule 401 defines
relevant evidence as "evidence having any tend-
ency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action
more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." 116 If, in order to be considered rele-
vant, an item of evidence must merely "tend to
prove the matter sought to be proved," 1 17 co-con-
spirators' hearsay evidence is relevant, and Rule
104 (the Revised Draft version of Rule 1-04 of the
Preliminary Draft) would not apply.
TRIAL BY JURY
The possible denial of a defendant's constitu-
tional right to a trial by juryn1 is advanced as an
additional justification for the procedure outlined
in the California rule and the Preliminary Draft of
the Proposed Federal Rules (i.e., to commit the
"preliminary fact" or "independent proof" ques-
tions to the jury).1 9 The California Assembly
Committee stated that the preliminary fact ques-
tions of the existence of a conspiracy and a de-
fendant's participation in it should not be finally
decided by the trial judge "because they have been
traditionally regarded as jury questions." 110 The
Committee concluded that:
The questions involve.., the probative value of
evidence that it is admitted on the ultimate issues.
It is the jury's function to determine the effect and
value of the evidence addressed to it.... Hence,
the judge's function on questions of this sort is
merely to determine whether there is evidence
sufficient to permit a jury to decide the question.
114 Id. at 186-87.
"S PROP. FED. R. EviD. 104, Adv. Comm. Note, at 13.
"
8 Id. Rule 401, at 28.
117 Id. Adv. Comm. Note to Rule 401, at 28.
... U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury .... "
19 CAL. EviD. CODE § 403, Assem. Comm. Comment
(West 1966); PRELn. DRAFT PROP. FED. R. Even.,
Adv. Comm. Note to Rule 1-04, at 190.
1"0 CAL. Evn. CODE § 403, Assem. Comm. Comment
(West 1966).
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... If the judge finally determined the existence
or non-existence of the preliminary fact, he would
deprive a party of a jury decision on a question
that the party has a right to have decided by the
jury.
21
The drafters of the Preliminary and Revised
Drafts of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
reached a similar conclusion. The Advisory Com-
mittee noted that the trial judge does not make
the final determination with respect to preliminary
questions of conditional relevancy.
122 If he did,
"'the functioning of the jury as a trier of fact would
"be greatly restricted and in some cases virtually
-destroyed." 12 The Revised Draft provides that
the judge shall commit preliminary fact questions
to the jury if he concludes there is sufficient proof
to take the questions to them; however, the jury
will not be specially instructed to disregard the
-evidence if the conditions are found by them not
to be fulfilled." 4 In effect, then, the Revised Draft
withdraws from the jury the preliminary fact
-question. This, of course, is consistent with the
Carbo decision.
Despite the concern that the jury's role not be
reduced, allowing the judge to decide preliminary
fact questions does not appear seriously to restrict
the jury's function. As the Ninth Circuit pointed
out in Carbo, the conspiracy situation is confusing
because the preliminary fact question, upon which
the admissibility of co-conspirators' hearsay evi-
dence depends, coincides with the ultimate ques-
tion for the jury on the issue of guilt.
125 Since the
decision on the ultimate issue is entrusted to the
jury, it should also decide preliminary questions.1
2 6
In fact, however, the judge only decides the pre-
liminary questions of the existence of a conspiracy
and a defendant's connection with it for purposes
of admissibility. The judge's decision does not
prevent the jury from giving the ultimate decision
on the basis of all the evidence. Moreover, the sixth
amendment does not seem to require a jury deter-
mination of all questions of fact in a criminal
trial. 27
One conclusion to be drawn is that the jury
should play a limited role in deciding preliminary
121 Id.
"'PROp. FED. R. EviD., Adv. Comm. Note to Rule
104, at 13; PRELim. Da-rr PRop. FED. R. Evm. at 190.123 Id.
124 See note 122 supra.
12s 314 F.2d at 736.
"'See MAGuIRE, supra note 36, at 220; MAGWr= &
EPSTEIN, supra note 103, at 418.
12 See note 114 supra.
fact questions. The Ninth Circuit in Carbo and
the drafters of Section 403 and Rule 104 agree that
the judge must determine the admissibility of
co-conspirators' hearsay evidence."3 This approach
finds analogous support in Supreme Court decisions
requiring the judge to make a preliminary deter-
mination of the voluntariness of a confession"3
These cases suggest that in the absence of a pre-
liminary finding of admissibility by the trial judge,
submission of the issues of the existence of a con-
spiracy and a defendant's connection with it to
the jury does not afford a defendant a reliable
determination of these issues and is therefore an
unconstitutional denial of due process."0
"'314 F.2d at 736-37; see CAr. EvmD. CODE § 403,
Assem. Comm. Comment (West 1966); Piop. FED. R.
Evm., Adv. Comm. Note to Rule 104, at 11-14.
1"9See, e.g., Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (1967);
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In Jackson the
Supreme Court held that in the absence of an inde-
pendent finding of the voluntariness of a confession by
the trial judge, submission of the question of voluntari-
ness to the jury which also adjudicates guilt does not
afford a defendant a reliable determination of the volun-
tariness issue and is therefore an unconstitutional denial
of due process. 378 U.S. at 376-78. The Court was in-
fluenced by the possibility that even when the jury de-
cides that the confession was involuntary, it would be
unable to disregard what it believes to be an involun-
tary, but truthful, confession in making a decision as to
innocence or guilt. Id. The Court noted that there is no
"indication of how the jury resolved disputes in the
evidence concerning the critical facts," and that it can-
not be discovered "whether the jury found the confes-
sion voluntary and relied upon it, or involuntary and
supposedly ignored it." Id. at 379. When the issue of
voluntariness is resolved by the jury, findings of fact
cannot be ascertained from the general verdict. Conse-
quently, an appellate court can only speculate as to
which evidence actually led to the verdict of guilty. Id.
at 380. Thus, the voluntariness issue cannot be sub-
mitted to the jury unless there has been a preliminary
determination by the trial court that the confession is
voluntary.
10The conspiracy cases illustrate that defendants
often raise this issue. See, e.g., White v. United States,
394 F.2d at 54; United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d at
479; United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d at 41. But no
defendant has argued that the absence of a preliminary
finding of a conspiracy and a defendant's connection
with it by the trial judge constitutes an unconstitutional
denial of due process. However, such an argument seems
destined to fail, since where there is no clear ruling by
the trial judge on this issue, the appellate courts assume
that he made the essential preliminary finding, and will
affirm if there is evidence to support the finding. For
example, the Sixth Circuit stated in Hofa:
We think there was sufficient evidence to make
out a priniafacie case linking Appellants with the
conspiracy and the Court would have been justified
in so holding in accordance with the rule of Carbo
and Dennis.
349 F.2d at 41 (emphasis added). And, in Wldte, the
Ninth Circuit concluded:
The fact that the trial judge denied a motion for
acquittal.., indicates that he did find that there
1972]
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While the division of responsibility between
judge and jury is reasonably dear, it is more diffi-
cult to reach conclusions as to the correct jury
instruction. There is substantial disagreement over
instructions between the Carbo court and the
drafters of Section 403.'-' However, the possibility
that a defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury
trial may be violated if the jury is not permitted
to reconsider the judge's determination of the
preliminary fact questions seems to outweigh any
argument based on jury confusion, particularly
when the courts which have followed the Carbo ra-
tionale characterize such a procedure as "harmless
error." 132
On the other hand, instructions similar to those
found in Rizzo v. United States,13s which require the
jury to decide the preliminary questions of the
existence of a conspiracy and a defendant's par-
ticipation in it upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, seem clearly erroneous. As the Ninth Circuit
pointed out in Carbo,
[I]f by independent evidence the defendant's posi-
tion as a co-conspirator is to be established by the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no occa-
sion ever to resort to the declarations at all.
34
Since the procedure set forth in Section 403 does
not specify any particular standard of proof for
the jury,135 it may be presumed that it calls for a
lesser standard-e.g., "prima facie" proof or "pre-
ponderance" of the evidence.
Consequently, if the trial judge concludes that
the jury might reasonably find, on the basis of the
independent evidence presented, that there was a
conspiracy and that the defendant was a conspira-
tor, he should admit the challenged co-conspira-
tors' hearsay statements. He then should instruct
the jury to disregard the co-conspirators' hearsay
evidence unless they also find, from the other evi-
dence, a conspiracy and the defendant's participa-
tion in it. Accordingly, a proper instruction would
read:
was sufficient other evidence, otherwise he would
have been bound to grant the motion pursuant to
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 29. We
agree that there was sufficient other evidence,
which if believed, would establish the existence of a
conspiracy. It was not error to submit this issue to
the jury.
394 F.2d at 54.
"I Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d at 736-37; CAL.
Evn. CODE § 403, Assem. Comm. Comment (West
1966).
11
2 See cases cited at note 94 supra.
'"3 See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
114 314 F.2d at 736.
'35 See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
If you conclude that a conspiracy did exist, you
should next determine whether the defendant was
a member of the conspiracy. In making this deter-
mination, you may consider only the statements
and conduct of the defendant. If you do not find
that the defendant was a member of the conspir-
acy, you must acquit him. However, if you do find
that the defendant was a member of the conspir-
acy, you may consider against the defendant the
statements of any other person found by you to be
a member of the conspiracy.
This instruction is consistent with current fed-
eral practice, although it goes further than Carbo
would strictly require. Moreover, it adopts the
approach of the Revised Draft of the Proposed
Federal Rules by giving the jury an affirmative
function only---i.e., the jury is not told to disregard
the evidence if the preliminary facts are not found
by them to exist.
Despite the care with which the instruction is
drawn, there is a real possibility that the jury may
be confused by the instruction and will utilize the
co-conspirators' hearsay statcments regardless of
its preliminary finding.3 6 Other courts have ques-
tioned the ability of a jury to follow limiting in-
structions. This likelihood of jury confusion
emphasizes the importance of the trial judge's
decision to admit the co-conspirators' hearsay
statements into evidence. His preliminary deter-
mination of admissibility is said to provide a
circumstantial guarantee of the trustworthiness of
the co-conspirators' hearsay statements, thereby
obviating the necessity of affording the defendant
an opportunity to cross-examine the declarants.'" s
Recent Supreme Court decisions3 dealing with
hearsay and confrontation bear upon the validity
of this assumption and provide an interesting
vehicle for consideration of the interplay between
the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause.
II. CONFRONTATION AND THE CO-
CONSPIRATORS EXCEPTION
By definition, the admission of hearsay state-
ments into evidence denies a criminal defendant
16 314 F.2d at 737.
(r See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 392 U.S. 123
(1968), where the instruction challenged directed the
jury to consider a confession of one defendant which
implicated another only against the defendant who
made the confession. The Court held that the instruc-
tion was ineffective to carry out its purported purpose
and thus did not safeguard the accused's right to con-
frontation. Id. at 137. See also United States v. Grune-
wald, 233 F.2d 556, 574 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting
opinion of Frank, J.); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d
1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
1"See 4 WimGoRE § 1080a; 5 Wroitoa §§ 1420-22.
'"See cases cited at note 152 infra.
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an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against him. 0 The confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment provides that "in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right...
to be confronted with the witnesses against
him .... "I41 Cross-examination is an essential
element of the right of confrontation.142 However,
neither the hearsay rule'43 nor the confrontation
clause"I guarantees an absolute right that all evi-
dence against an accused be presented by first-
hand testimony with its originator available for
cross-examination.
Since both the hearsay rule and the confronta-
tion clause are primarily concerned with the op-
portunity for cross-examination, some federal
courts have held that the admission of evidence
under an established exception to the hearsay rule
satisfies the confrontation requirement.'45
In so linking hearsay and confrontation, these
courts approximated the views of John Henry
Wigmore. Wigmore conceived cross-examination
to be the root concern of both doctrines. For him
the confrontation clause was intended to guarantee
a criminal defendant the same opportunity to
cross-examine adverse witnesses that the hearsay
rule had afforded."' The sixth amendment might
have contained a hearsav clause or a cross-exami-
nation clause. Although Wigmore believed that
the confrontation clause endorsed the principles of
the hearsay rule and its common law exceptions,
he did not see this "constitutionalization" of
common law doctrine as a bar to the progressive
development of hearsay exceptions.147
110 See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
M U.S. CoqsT. amend. VI.
112Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-05 (1965).
See 5 NVIG2ORE: § 1397; see also Salinger v. United
States, 272 U.S. 542 (1926); Diaz v. United States, 223
U.S. 442 (1912); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325
(1911); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900);
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
"'See note 26 supra.
" See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1895); Campbell v. United States, 415 F.2d 356 (6th
Cir. 1969).
M See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 410 F.2d 21
k2d Cir. 1970).
1465 VIGOORE § 1397 at 130-31.
1
7 The revision and extension of [the hearsay ex-
ception] is gradually progressing, and it is well to
appreciate fully that there is in this progress
nothing inconsistent with constitutional sanctions.
So bold are nowadays the attempts to wrest the
Constitution in aid of crime, and so complaisant
are some Courts in listening to fantastic and un-
founded objections to evidence, that the permis-
sibility of such changes should not be left in the
slightest doubt.
Id. at 135.
The relationship between the hearsay rule and
the sixth amendment confrontation requirement
has always been elusive, yet the Supreme Court
has but recently begun defining it."' The Court,
moreover, has expressly declined to develop the
entire relationship at one time,14 9 but rather has
left its development to a case-by-case unfolding.
The unfolding scheme, confined to a mere six years
of decisions, has failed to disentwine hearsay
principles from the confrontation clause. The re-
sulting overlap, an ill-defined congruence of the
two doctrines, has stultified the emergence of an
independent confrontation standard, 50 as well as
hopes of applying it consistently.
Beginning in 1965"' the Supreme Court rendered
a series of decisions"2 which suggested, not unlike
Wigmore, that the confrontation clause and, the
hearsay rule with its exceptions are closely inter-
twined, perhaps equivalent.l13 In Pointer v. Texas"'
the Court held that the admission of testimony at
defendant's trial taken at a preliminary hearing,
where the defendant was unrepresented, violated
the confrontation clause. The Court ruled that
the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant at the hearing and the declarant's un-
availability at trial rendered the testimony inad-
missible against the defendant."
5 -
In Douglas v. Alabama,16 decided with Pointer,
the confession of an alleged accomplice, which
implicated the defendant, was admitted against the
defendant at trial. The accomplice invoked his
privilege against self-incrimination, refusing to
1In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the
Court applied the confrontation clause, through the
fourteenth amendment, to the states. Prior to 1965, the
relationship between confrontation and the hearsay rule
was never squarely faced by the Court, and otherwise
only casually alluded to in dictum. See, e.g., Stein v.
New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (1953); Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934).
"' California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970).
"I Conversely,
If [the Court] has read into the Constitution a hear-
say rule of unknown proportions, reformers must
grapple not only with centuries of inertia but with
a constitutional prohibition as well.
Note, infra note 153, at 1436.
"I See note 148 supra.
"' See, e.g., Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971);
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965).
5 See Note, Confrontatin and the Hearsay Ride, 75
YALE L.J. 1434 (1966).
" 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The Court also held that the
confrontation clause applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment due process clause.
"'5 380 U.S. at 408.
156 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
19721
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answer questions about the confession. The Court
held:
In the circumstances of this case, petitioner's
inability to cross-examine Loyd as to the alleged
confession plainly denied him the right of cross-
examination secured by the Confrontation Clause.
... Hence, effective confrontation of Loyd was
possible only if Loyd affirmed the statement as
his."'
Pointer and Douglas were consistent with the
position that the hearsay rule and its exceptions
are coextensive with the scope of the confrontation
clause.64 Thus the denial of confrontation in
Pointer was merely the erroneous admission of
hearsay testimony, which resulted from the failure
of the testimony at the preliminary hearing to
qualify under the previously recorded testimony
exception to the hearsay rule. 59 Though the
Pointer Court never mentioned hearsay in finding
the confrontation violation, it acknowledged that
dying declarations and testimony of "deceased
witness[es] who [have] testified at a former trial"
have been held constitutionally admissible against
an accused. 60 Such statements fall squarely within
the "traditional" hearsay exceptions for dying
declarations and previously recorded testimony.
Moreover, the Court suggested that:
The case before us would be quite a different one
had [the witness'] statement been taken at a full-
fledged hearing at which petitioner had been repre-
sented by counsel who had been given a complete
and adequate opportunity to cross-examine.'
6'
Similarly, in Douglas the inability to cross-
examine the declarant rendered the statement
incapable of being fit into any traditional hearsay
157 Id. at 419-420.
'58 The dangers of this view were ably presented in
Note, supra note 153, which article the Supreme Court
subsequently cited in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
156 n. 8 (1970), and quoted from in Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 86 n. 17 (1970).
169 Testimony given as witness at another hear-
ing of the same or different proceeding, or in a
deposition taken in compliance with law in the
course of another proceeding, at the instance of
or against a party with an opportunity to de-
velop the testimony by direct cross or redirect
examination, with motive and interest similar
to those of the party against whom offered.
PROP. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(1). See generally Falknor,
Former Testimony and the Uniform Rides: A Comment,
38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 651, 651 n. 1 (1963). Cf. McCoRmicK
§§ 231-32.
160 380 U.S. at 407, citing Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237 (1895) (former testimony); Mattox v.
United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (dying declarations).
16 380 U.S. at 407.
exception. The statement could only be an admis-
sion as to the declarant. 1 The statement could
not qualify as a declaration against interest be-
cause it was against penal, not pecuniary or pro-
prietary interest.'6' Thus, one might conclude that
if a hearsay statement is offered which does not
fit within a traditional exception to the hearsay
rule, the Supreme Court would find its admission
violative of the confrontation clause.
A less secure conclusion is that the Court would
uphold the admission of hearsay evidence satisfy-
ing the requirements of a traditional hearsay ex-
ception. The latter conclusion was the first to be
rejected by the Court.
In Barber v. Page'64 the Court held that the ad-
mission of prior recorded testimony violated the
confrontation clause where the declarant was
available to testify, though imprisoned in another
jurisdiction. Under the traditional hearsay excep-
tion, unavailability was satisfied where the witness
was beyond a court's power of service of process.i"s
The Supreme Court ruled that today's increased
cooperation between the states and the federal
government, and among the states, required an up-
dating of a prosecutor's burden of showing una-
vailability. 6 6 Confrontation required the prosecu-
162 MCCORMCK § 239 (emphasis added):
Admissions are the words or acts of a party-
opponent or of his predecessor or representative,
offered as evidence against him.
The Proposed Federal Rules, PRoP. FED. R. Evim.
801(d) (2) takes a new approach to admissions. Instead
of making admissions admissible within an exception to
the hearsay rule, they are excluded from the definition
of hearsay and are thus admissible. However, to qualify
as an admission the declaration must be "offered
against a party.... "
16 3 See McCoescx § 255. The scope of the hearsay
exception for declarations against interest has been nar-
rowed to exclude declarations against penal interest
from the exception and from admission into evidence.
For an excellent review of the background of this rule,
see McClain v. Anderson Free Press, 232 S.C. 448, 102
S.E.2d 750 (1958). However, the limitation seems to be
withering. See, e.g., People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868,
389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964); CAL. Evm.
CODE § 1230 (West 1966); PROP. FED. R. Evm.
804(b)(4).
1- 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
16 5 See 5 WIGMoRE § 1404; McCosmcn § 234:
"Permanent or indefinite residence without the state
should always suffice" to satisfy the unavailability re-
quirement of the previously recorded testimony excep-
tion. The Proposed Federal Rules, PROp. FED. R.
Evm. 804(a)(5) defines "unavailability," a requisite
for the exceptions illustrated by Rule 804(b), to mean
that the declarant:
Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of
his statement has been unable to procure his at-
tendance by process or other reasonable means.
1
66 The Court noted, in reaching this conclusion, the
power of federal courts to issue writs requiring attend-
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tor's good faith effort16 to secure presence of the
witness in light of available contemporary proce-
dures. 16
Subsequently, in California v. Green, 169 the Court
eclipsed the first conclusion that non-traditional
hearsay exceptions would be found unconstitu-
tional. In Green, the Court considered the admissi-
bility of prior testimony of a witness who claimed
a lapse of memory at trial. Unlike most other
jurisdictions, California permits the introduction
of prior inconsistent statements into evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted,170 not
merely to impeach credibility.173 The Supreme
Court held that the California rule is not incon-
sistent with the confrontation clause.
In Green, after the chief prosecution witness,
Porter, claimed a lapse of memory, the state
introduced his sworn, cross-examined testimony
taken at a preliminary hearing in which he stated
that Green had sold him marijuana. A police
ance of witnesses from outside their jurisdiction. 390
U.S. at 724.
The Court also held that the defendant had not
waived his right to cross-examine at the preliminary
hearing, but noted that even had he done so, the deci-
sion would have been the same. Id. at 725. This point
was reaffirmed in Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314
(1968), which held Barber to apply retroactively. In
Berger the defendant had been afforded a full oppor-
tunity at a prior hearing to cross-examine the subse-
quently unavailable witness. The Court again held that
absent a showing of a good faith effort by the prosecu-
tion to produce the witness for trial, the confrontation
clause precludes the admission of such evidence.167Barber has been viewed as a case of prosecutorial
misconduct. 400 U.S. at 87.
I" Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court in
Barber, noted that "[t]he right of confrontation may not
be dispensed with so easily." 390 U.S. at 725. He sug-
gested that under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) the federal
courts had power to issue writs of habeas corpus ad
tesiificandurn at the request of state prosecution authori-
ties, in order to provide the state with a federally in-
carcerated witness.
169 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
170 
CAL. Evm. CODE § 1235 (West 1966). The Pro-
posed Federal Rules also permit the use of prior incon-
sistent statements as substantive proof. Pnop. FED. R.
Ev~i. 801(d)(1). The Supreme Court of Illinois re-
cently held that prior inconsistent statements may be
used for impeachment purposes only, declining an in-
vitation to follow the California and Proposed Rules'
"reform." See People v. Collins, 49 Ill. 2d 179, 274
N.E.2d 77 (1971) (opinion of Mr. Justice Schaefer). The
Supreme Courts of Wisconsin and Kentucky have per-
mitted the use of prior inconsistent statements as sub-
stantive proof. See Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 164
N.W.2d 609 (1969); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436
S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969).
17 See, e.g., Ellis v. United States, 138 F.2d 612, 616-
21 (8th Cir. 1943); State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358,
361-62, 285 N.W. 898, 900-01 (1939). For a collection
of cases see 3A WIoaroaE § 1018.
officer testified that Porter had recounted a similar
story to him. These two out-of-court statements,
admitted for their truth under the California
statutory definition of hearsay, constituted the
case-in-chief against Green. The Supreme Court
stated that the issue was "whether a defendant's
constitutional right 'to be confronted by the wit-
nesses against him' is necessarily inconsistent with
a State's decision to change its hearsay rules to re-
flect the minority view." 172
In holding that the confrontation clause had
not been violated the Court stated:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules
and the Confrontation Clause are generally de-
signed to protect similar values, it is quite a differ-
ent thing to suggest that the overlap is complete
and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more
or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay
and their exceptions as they existed historically at
common law. Our decisions have never established
such a congruence; indeed, we have more than
once found a violation of confrontation values even
though the statements in issue were admittedunder
an arguably recognized hearsay exception. See
Barber v. Page... Pointer v. Texas.... The con-
verse is equally true: merely because evidence is
admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay
fule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that
confrontation rights have been denied. [citations
omitted]'"
The specific holding of Green was twofold. First,
the Court ruled that if a declarant was available
for cross-examination at trial, the confrontation
clause did not bar admission of out-of-court state-
ments made by the declarant.174 Though a state's
evidentiary rules might bar substantive use of
prior inconsistent statements, the confrontation
clause was satisfied so long as the defendant could
"confront" the declarant as to any statements he
had made. Second, the Court held that where the
declarant was not present at trial, the sixth amend-
ment was satisfied if the opportunity to cross-
examine was present when the declarant made the
incriminating statement.175  Consequently, in
i 399 U.S. at 155.
173 Id. at 155-56.
274 The Court noted that prior consistent testimony
was not susceptible to effective cross-examination at
trial because it tended to "harden" with time. This
danger, felt the Court, was not present in Green where
"the witness has changed his testimony so that... his
prior statement has softened to the point where he now
repudiates it." 399 U.S. at 159.
175 Id. at 165.
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Green, Porter's failure to cooperate at trial, if
found to preclude effective cross-examination,
did not render his prior statement inadmissible.
As in Douglas, the confrontation clause was satis-
fied by "a complete and adequate opportunity to
cross-examine" at the preliminary hearing.
176
In Green, the Court laid to rest speculation that
the confrontation clause was defined by the hear-
say rule and its traditional exceptions. More
exactly, the Court disclaimed that the sixth amend-
ment codified hearsay rules "as they existed his-
torically at common law." '7 This disclaimed
congruence would define confrontation narrowly
by the state of the common law, always confused,
178
at some arbitrary, historic time. Thus the Green
Court merely disassociated the confrontation
clause from some arbitrary set of hearsay rules
and exceptions. The Court, however, did not
divorce confrontation requirements from the
strictures of hearsay principles. Green left unan-
swered the extent to which the confrontation
clause borrowed from common law notions of
necessity, availability of witnesses, opportunity
to cross-examine and testimonial reliability. Yet
to the degree that a confrontation standard par-
takes of hearsay principles, a congruence is estab-
lished, albeit not so narrowly defined an equation
as Green disclaimed. The Court should not be
quick to establish such a congruence, for it sug-
gests that the Court will be in the business of re-
viewing a trial court's determinations of eviden-
tiary trustworthiness and weight, a task for which
it is ill-suited.ln
Within six months of deciding Green, the Court
faced just such a task in Dutton v. Evans °80 The
defendant, Evans, was tried for the murder of
three police officers in Georgia. Two other men
allegedly participated in the crime, Truett and
Williams. Truett was granted immunity and
testified against Evans and apparently against
Williams, who was tried separately. At Evans'
trial the prosecution called a man named Shaw as
a witness. Shaw testified that he and Williams
were fellow prisoners in the federal penitentiary
in Atlanta at the time Williams was brought to
176Justice Brennan, dissenting in Green felt that
Barber undermined the view that cross-examination at
a preliminary hearing could satisfy the confrontation
clause. Id. at 195. See People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654,
663, 451 P.2d 422, 428, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782, 788 (1969)
(differences between a trial and a preliminary hearing).
i77 399 U.S. at 155-56.
78 McCoRMcIK § 231.
7 See Note, supra note 153, at 1436.
180 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
state court for arraignment on the murder charges
involved in Dutton. Shaw testified that when Wil-
liams returned to the prison from the arraignment
Shaw asked Williams, "How did you make out in
court?" and that Williams responded: "If it hadn't
been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we
wouldn't be in this now."
Defense counsel's objection that this statement
was hearsay and violative of Evans' right of
confrontation. was overruled by the trial court.
The Georgia Supreme Court"" upheld the ruling
on the basis of a Georgia statute which provides:
After the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the
declarations by any one of the conspirators during
the pendency of the criminal project shall be admis-
sible against all.
8'
This statute differs from the generally accepted
co-conspirator's exception, and that existing in
the federal system, in that it permits admission of
out-of-court statements made after the commission
of a crime and while the conspirators are concealing
their guilt.8 3
Speaking for the Court in a plurality opinion,
Justice Stewart first dimissed the defendant's
claim that the Georgia hearsay exception violated
the confrontation clause by exceeding the scope
of the common law or federal co-conspirator hear-
say exception. Justice Stewart noted that Green
explicitly denied that common law hearsay excep-
tions defined the limits of admissibility under the
sixth amendment.18 4 Furthermore, he pointed out
that the narrow scope of the co-conspirators
hearsay exception was a product of the "Court's
'disfavor' of 'attempts to broaden the already
pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy
prosecutions.' "85 Since Dutton did not involve
the substantive offense of conspiracy, the Court
concluded that such policy questions as might
arise from this "disfavor" were not present 8 6
Ls 222 Ga. 392, 150 S.E.2d 240 (1966). The district
court's denial of habeas corpus was reversed by the
Fifth Circuit. Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.
1968).
113 GA. A-N. CoDE § 38-306 (1954).
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1968); FED. R. CRan. P. 26.
See also note 47 supra. For a criticism of the traditional
co-conspirator exception, see Comment, Preserving the
Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. Rxv. 741,
755-56 (1965).
184 400 U.S. at 82.
ss Id.
I8" Id. at 83. The Court thereby reserved considera-
tion of whether the co-conspirator exception to the
hearsay role violates the confrontation clause in con-
spiracy prosecutions. But there is little reason to sus-
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The Court then turned to its recent decisions to
determine whether Evans' conviction had to be
set aside under their "impact." Pointer was dis-
tinguished with Pointer's own words that use of
the transcript there "'denied petitioner any op-
portunity to have the benefit of counsel's cross-
examination of the principal witness against
him.' "'8 Douglas was said to involve "an even
more flagrant violation of the defendant's right of
confrontation," referring to the fact that the out-
of-court statements had been read to the jury by
the prosecutor and that the Douglas Court con-
sidered these statements to be of "crucial impor-
tance" in the case.' Barber was distinguished be-
cause it turned upon an "unavailability" issue-
the Court stating that Barber was "even further
afield." 119
The Court then asserted that it would confine
itself to a determination of the case before it.90 It
affirmed the conviction upon two grounds. First,
it found that the disputed evidence was not "in
any sense 'crucial' or 'devastating'" as in the
cases it had distinguished.' Second, application
of the Georgia evidentiary rule in the "circum-
stances of this case" was not found to violate the
sixth amendment.'
9'
In concluding that Shaw's testimony was not
pect that the Court would fashion a general rule finding
such a violation.
The case-by-case approach to confrontation clause
issues adopted by Dutton precludes such a possibility.
Moreover, the policy considerations in conspiracy trials
are likely to be resolved in favor of admission of co-con-
spirator's hearsay statements by the current and
prospective "law and order" Court. Given the secretive
uature of most conspiracies and the problems en-
countered with circumstantial proof of them, co-con-
spirator's hearsay testimony will likely be viewed as
necessary for conviction-more necessary, on balance,
than defendants' rights to confrontation. Even Mr.
justice Harlan, balancing the problems of proof of
conspiracy against a defendant's right to a fair trial,
resolves the issue in favor of admitting hearsay evidence.
See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 99-100 (1970) (con-
curring opinion of Harlan, J.).
'87 Id. at 84, quoting Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403.
m 400 U.S. at 84, quoting Douglas, 380 U.S. at 417.
"1 400 U.S. at 85. Other cases distinguished, con-
cededly of little significance in the determination of
Dutton, were Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) (in-
volving the issue of waiver of the right to cross-exam-
ine); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (in-
volving the ability of a jury to follow instructions, in a
joint trial, not to consider one defendant's statements
in determining the guilt of another defendant, there
being no dispute that the declarant's statements were
inadmissible against the co-defendant); and Roberts v.
Russell, 397 U.S. 293 (1969) (holding Bruton applicable
to the states and retroactive).
190 400 U.S. at 86.
9 Id. at 87.
14fd. at 88.
critical, the Court noted that the prosecution in
Dutton had presented nineteen witnesses other than
Shaw and that all were available for cross-examina-
tion at Evans' trial. The Court concluded that
the disputed evidence consisted of "a brief con-
versation," that the evidence "was of peripheral
significance at most," and "was admitted under a
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule long
established under state statutory law." 193
The Court's conclusions as to the brief and
peripheral nature of the testimony relied on the
presumption that the jury was not unduly influ-
enced by Shaw's statement. This presumption,
the Court suggested, arose from the vague nature
of Shaw's assertion which "carried on its face a
warning to the jury against giving the statement
undue weight." 194 But surely such judicial second-
guessing is an unseemly basis for a constitutional
decision. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Marshall pointed
out in his dissent in Dutton, 195 the impropriety of
such speculation appeared to provide the basis for
the Court's decision in Bruton v. United States.'"
The Court's additional notation that Shaw's
statement was admitted under a long-standing
state rule of evidence must be deemed gratutitous.
There was no dispute that the statement was
within the Georgia co-conspirators exception. The
longevity of the statutory exception does not bear
upon whether the evidence admitted under it is
crucial or devastating, or whether it violates the
sixth amendment.
197
The Court's analysis would support the conclu-
sion that admission of the disputed evidence was
harmless error, but the plurality opinion 'never
used that language 9 Thus the Court left u'nan-
swered what weight it gave its finding that the
disputed statement was not crucial evidence in
determining that there was no confrontation
violation.
Whatever Justice Stewart's opinion was in-
tended to communicate on the "devastating and
crucial" issue, it disturbingly recalls the justifica-
tion given for the admission of the hearsay evidence
at the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. As Mr. Justice
191 Id. at 87.
191 Id. at 88.
'
95 Id. at 103-04.
96 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
19 As Justice Marshall noted, the plurality opinion
"surely does not mean that a defendant's constitutional
right must give way to a state evidentiary rule." 400
U.S. at 105.
"g But see Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion
finding the statement's admission "harmless error if it
was error at all." Id. at 90.
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Stewart notes in his opinion in Dutton, "It has
been suggested that [the confrontation clause] is
based on a common-law principle that had its
origin in a reaction to abuses at the trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh .... "199 At Sir Walter Raleigh's
trial for treason, the confession of an alleged co-
conspirator, Lord Cobham, implicating Raleigh,
was admitted into evidence. Lord Cobham was
not called to testify, although he was "in the house
hard by, and may seen [sic] be brought hither.
" 200
In response to Sir Walter Raleigh's demand that
Cobham be produced as a witness at the trial,
Chief Justice Popham explained why this could
not be done:
Where no circumstances do concur to make a mat-
ter probable, then an accuser may be heard; but so
many circumstances agreeing and confirming the ac-
cusation in this case, the accuser is not to be produced;
for, having first confessed against himself volun-
tarily, and so charged another person, if we shall
now hear him again in person, he may for favour or
fear, retract what formerly he hath said, and the
jury may, by that means, be inveigled. [emphasis
added]
201
Yet Mr. Justice Stewart stressed that the Dutton
decision rested weightedly on the "not crucial or
devastating" conclusion. 2n This so, the difference
between this justification for Dutton and the long
criticized thinking behind Lord Popham's decision
in Sir Walter Raleigh's case disappears.
The second ground for the Dutton decision was
that admission of the disputed evidence did not
violate the confrontation clause. The Court ex-
plained that this decision was reached under a
constitutional standard of confrontation which
was not defined by hearsay doctrine. It reasserted
its position in Green that the Court had never
equated confrontation with the rules of hearsay
and their exceptions and that "we decline to do
so now." 203
199 Id. at 86 n. 16. (citation omitted).
200 J. G. PHILMORE, HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAw OF EVIDENCE 157 (1850), as quoted in D. Louis-
ELL, J. KAPLAN &. J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE 50 (1968).
201 Id.
22 The plurality opinion closed with a quotation
from an opinion written by Mr. Justice Cardozo in
which the Court declined to set aside a state criminal
conviction on confrontation grounds. Cardozo stated:
There is danger that the criminal law will be
brought into contempt.., if gossamer possibilities
of prejudice to a defendant are to nullify a sen-
tence.., and set the guilty free.
400 U.S. at 89-90, quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
= 400 U.S. at 86.
Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, denied
that a confrontation issue underlay the question
whether the declarant made the statement Shaw
related at trial. Shaw, assured the Court, was
available for effective cross-examination on that
issue.204 The confrontation issue, according to-
Justice Stewart, arose instead because "the jury
was being invited to infer that Williams had im-
plicitly identified Evans as the perpetrator of the
murder when he blamed Evans for his predica-
ment." 20 5 Justice Stewart gave four reasons" 6 why
this invitation, involving a "question of iden-
tity," 207 did not violate the confrontation clause.
First, the statement contained no express assertion
about past fact and consequently carried with it,
on its face, a warning to the jury against giving it
undue weight. Second, declarant-Williams' per-
sonal knowledge of the identity and role of the
other participants in the murder was "abundantly
established" by other evidence. Third, the possi-
bility that Williams' statement was "founded on
faulty recollection is remote in the extreme."
Finally, there was reason to "suppose" that Wil-
liams "did not misrepresent Evans' involvement
in the crime" because he "had no apparent reason
to lie," his "statement was spontaneous, and it was
against his penal interest to make it."
The Court's first two reasons support the con-
clusion that the evidence was not crucial or dev-
astating, rather than establish any standard for
determining when the confrontation clause is vio-
lated by admision of evidence for some other
reason. The Court's conclusion that the statement
itself adequately aroused a jury against giving it
undue weight means that the evidence was pre-
sumptively of little weight or importance. Simi-
larly, that there was other evidence which "abun-
dantly established" the declarants' personal knowl-
edge of the identity and role of the other partici-
pants in the murder indicates that the disputed
evidence was of no consequence in deciding those
issues.
Thus, the first two reasons supporting no con-
frontation clause violation suggest the presump-
tion that the jury gave the evidence little or no
weight. In other words, admission of the evidence
was harmless error at most.2 11But the Court never
2
14 Id. at 88.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 88-89.2 7 Id. at 88.
202 As noted previously, supra note 198 and accom-
panying text, Mr. Justice Blackmun asserts harmless
error as a separate ground for reaching the same deci-
sion as the plurality in the case-a ground which Black-
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used the term "harmless error." Since the Court re-
peated itself, and again hammered at the inconse-
quence, though not harmlessness, of Shaw's
testimony, it seems fair again to question what
bearing that conclusion had on the confrontation
issue. If the Court meant to incorporate a test of
importance or weight in the confrontation stand-
ard, it reintroduced an abuse the confrontation
standard was intended to correct0i If the Court
meant instead to distinguish Dutton from previous
decisions finding confrontation violations, that
distinction alone failed to resolve the confronta-
tion issue in Dutton. Summed up, none of the
Court's variations on the "not crucial or devastat-
ing evidence" theme disposed of the defendant's
constitutional argument.
The third and fourth reasons advanced by Jus-
tice Stewart for the conclusion that the confronta-
tion clause was not violated spoke to the relia-
bility of Williams' statement. He asserted that
there was reason to conclude that the declarant's
recollection was accurate. Certainly, circumstantial
guarantees of such accuracy may substitute for
testing accuracy by cross-examination, thus
making the evidence admissible without produc-
ing the declarant at trial. This reasoning is con-
sistent with the traditional approach to determin-
ing whether hearsay evidence should be admitted;
that is, whether there should be an exception from
the exclusionary rule because of the inherent relia-
bility of the statement 10 Unfortunately, the
plurality opinion failed to state why it found cir-
cumstantial guarantees of accuracy present in the
case before it.
Finally, Mr. Justice Stewart stated that since
Williams had no apparent reason to lie and his
statement was spontaneous and against his penal
interest, there was no reason to conclude that the
statement was inherently untrustworthy. Stewart
declared that such circumstances "are indicia of
reliability which have been widely viewed as
determinative of whether a statement may be
placed before the jury though there is no confronta-
tion of the declarant." 211 Presumably this means
that the disputed evidence fell within the hearsay
exceptions for spontaneous exclamations 12 and
declarations against interest.213 But neither excep-
mun apparently believed was absent in the plurality
opinion.
2o See text accompanying notes 199-202 supra.
0 See 5 WIGmopnn §§ 1420-24.
21 400 U.S. at 89.
212 See, e.g., McCoamcK § 272; PRoP. FED. R.
Evm. 803(1)-(2).
mSee McCoRaMcn §§ 253-57; 5 WIGmoRE §§ 1455-
tion, as traditionally defined, comfortably em-
braces the disputed statement2 4 Moreover, the
opinion disclaimed using the hearsay rule as a
basis for determining the confrontation issue. The
Court appears to have abstracted principles of
testimonial reliability from, but without reference
to, traditional hearsay exceptions. Dutton thus
announces the sixth amendment's appropriation
of hearsay concepts in unknown quantities to test
evidentiary reliability under the confrontation
clause. 15
The Dutton decision provides no reliable stand-
ards by which one may with confidence determine
issues arising under the confrontation clause.
Surely, in attempting to follow Dutton, courts will
resort to subjective determination of whether or
not the evidence was crucial, devastating, or
prejudicial. However, such determinations do not
appear relevant to standards inhering in the
confrontation clause, or to be distinguishable
from general notions of fairness and due process.
On balance, one is tempted to conclude that the
Court has in fact adopted a due process standard.
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in Dutlon, felt
that the plurality decision did not "explain the
77; PRop. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)-(4). Although the
exception for declarations against interest has been
limited traditionally to statements against pecuniary
or proprietary interest, the recent trend has been to al-
low statements against penal interest to be admitted
into evidence within the exception. See, e.g., in addition
to authorities cited supra, United States v. Dovico, 261
F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 325
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389"U.S. 944 (1967).214 The spontaneous utterance exception traditionally
applies to statements generated by an exciting event
either participated in by the declarant or witnessed
by him. See McComulcK § 272; 6 WlioRO §§ 1745-47.
Other exceptions which depend upon spontaneity to
qualify for admissibility include declarations of bodily
condition, see McComcic §§ 265-67; PRoP. FED. R.
Evm. 803(3), and declarations of mental state, see
McComac-, §§ 268-71; PRop. FED. R. Evro. 803(3).
Arguably, Williams' statement in Dutton might be
within the exception for declarations of mental state,
but his mental state was not in issue. Thus the state-
ment would only be probative of an issue in dispute if
it were true that Evans was the perpetrator of the
murder.
As noted previously, the traditional exception for
declarations against interest would not apply, since the
statement was against penal, not proprietary or.
pecuniary interest. See note 163 supra and accompany-
ing text. If as indicated in this analysis of Douglas,
supra note 163 and accompanying text, Douglas could
not be decided on the basis of the declarations against
interest exception, then the reference to the declaration
being against penal interest in Dutton may buttress
Stewart's assertion that the case was not being decided
by equating the confrontation clause with hearsay
exceptions.215 See generally Supreme Court Reiew-Confronta-
tion, 62 J. CRIu. L.C. & P.S. 516 (1971).
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standard by which it test[ed]" the disputed state-
ment, "or how this standard [could] be squared
with the seemingly absolute command of the
clause .... "2 216 Harlan concluded that the con-
frontation clause was wholly inappropriate for
testing rules of evidence. He contended that it
should be restricted to requiring the trial presence
and cross-examination of adverse witnesses. He
then asserted that the due process clause of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments provides the ap-
propriate standard.217 Harlan applied that standard
to Dutton and concluded that due process of law
had been accomplished because of the nature of
conspiracies; 18 because without the admission of
hearsay evidence, "the facts it reveals are likely
to remain hidden from the jury"; 219 because one
weighing the necessity for admission against the
danger of the jury giving it undue weight "might
reasonably conclude that admission would in-
crease the likelihood of just determinations of
truth";O and because "I cannot say that [exclu-
sion of the statement] ... is essential to a fair
trial.212
Dulton does nothing to clarify the entanglement
216 400 U.S. at 96.
21 Id. at 96-97.
21
8 Id. at 99.
219 Id.
20 Id.
= Id. at 100.
of the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule
and its exceptions. Pointer approached the prob-
lem without reference to hearsay. Green denied
that the scope of the confrontation clause is deter-
minable by the hearsay rule and its exceptions as
defined at common law. Dutton is confusing. It is a
plurality decision. The swing vote was provided
by Justice Harlan. Yet, not only was the theory of
his concurring opinion different from the plural-
ity's, but Harlan largely rejected his prior views
expressed in a Green concurring opinion. The Dut-
ton Court introduced notions of testimonial weight
which failed to relate to the central issue in Dut-
ton-confrontation. The Court also announced
heretofore unused standards of testimonial relia-
bility to test the confrontation issue. These circum-
stances add to the decision's ambiguity and insure
that Dutton will be of little value in future coh-
frontation decisions.=
mmu Commonwealth v. Thomas, 443 Pa. 234, 279
A.2d 20 (1971), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
relying upon Dutton, concluded that hearsay statements,
falling within the state of mind exception, were in no
sense "crucial" or "devastating" and thus their, ad-
mission was not violative of the sixth amendment.
This conclusion was further supported by the assertion
that "the evidence was not so prejudicial that the jury
could not properly evaluate it.' 443 Pa. at 279 A.2d at
25. The Court did not attempt to resolve the case by
reference to indicia of reliability of the disputed
statement, although it noted that the fact the state-
ments were offered to prove was shown by other
evidence.
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